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This paper uses industry-level data to analyse labour-productivity growth over the
past decade and a half.  It focuses on the role of the service sector in determining
the strength of productivity growth.  In particular, it examines the factors that led to
falling labour-productivity in the retail and wholesale trade and the personal and
other services industries over the second half of the 1980s.  In both industries, wage
restraint played an important role.  In addition, in the retail and wholesale trade
industry, measured productivity growth was retarded by the deregulation of store
trading hours.  At the aggregate level, a number of factors suggest that productivity
growth over the second half of the 1990s is going to be considerably faster than that
over the second half of the 1980s.
The links between productivity growth, wages and prices are also explored using
the industry level data.  These data suggest that differential rates of productivity
growth across industries are reflected more in relative prices than in relative wages.
The wage data also suggest that productivity growth in the finance, property and
business services industry suffers from considerable measurement errors.ii
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During much of the 1980s, labour-productivity growth in Australia was unusually
slow (see Figure 1). Between March 1983 and June 1991 (which are equivalent
points in the business cycle), output per hour worked in the non-farm economy
increased at an annual rate of just 0.68 per cent per year. This compares with
average annual labour-productivity growth of 1.34 per cent over the previous
five years, and 2.51 per cent growth over the subsequent three years. This period of
slow labour-productivity growth occurred at the same time that employment was
growing rapidly. The most frequently offered explanation for this combination of
favourable labour-market outcomes but low productivity growth is that the Prices
and Incomes Accord held down real wages and led to a substitution of labour for
capital.1 The growth of the service sector and measurement problems are also
sometimes cited as explanations for the 1980s productivity slowdown.
Figure 1: Labour Productivity in the Non-Farm Sector
(March quarter 1978 = 100)














                                               
1 See EPAC (1989), Dowrick (1990), Dixon and McDonald (1992) and Phipps, Sheen and
Wilkins (1992).2
This paper uses industry-level productivity and wages data in an attempt to improve
our understanding of labour-productivity outcomes over the period since 1978. It
does not contradict the explanation based on changes in the relative price of labour,
but argues that the story is richer than that suggested by the simple factor-
substitution explanation. The paper pays particular attention to the slowdown in
labour-productivity growth over the second half of the 1980s. Over that period, four
industries – construction, wholesale and retail trade, finance, property and business
services and recreation, personal and other services – experienced declines in the
level of labour productivity. The paper examines possible reasons for these declines
and examines the contribution of these industries to the aggregate productivity
slowdown.
The industry data raise a number of interesting issues. Foremost amongst these is
the issue of how to measure output in the service industries. This problem is
graphically illustrated by the wholesale and retail trade industry. Despite the
adoption of new technologies and rationalisation within the industry, the measured
level of labour productivity fell over the second half of the 1980s. To a significant
extent this fall was the result of the deregulation of shopping hours, which led to an
increase in opening hours and employment. While deregulation is unlikely to have
led to more goods being processed through the checkout (the standard measure of
output), it certainly made shopping more convenient. While statisticians attempt to
make adjustments for improvements in the quality of goods, no adjustments are
made for improvements in the quality of services. The result of this is that
deregulation of shopping hours led to a reduction in measured output per hour
worked, but to an increase in many people’s living standards. As the service sector
continues to expand, contradictions of this sort will become more frequent.
While measurement problems in other service industries adversely affect the
measured level of real output, they can only explain the productivity slowdown if
the service sector’s share of total employment increased substantially or, somehow,
the measurement problems became worse in the 1980s. There is some evidence that
measurement problems did in fact become more severe in the finance, property and
business services sector and, in particular, in the wholesale and retail trade industry.
Measurement problems appear to have played a much smaller role in explaining the
slowdown in productivity growth in the recreation, personal and other services
sector. In this sector,  compositional shifts appear to have been important. In
addition, declines in real product wages allowed rapid employment growth, despite
the fact that the average level of labour productivity of the new workers was less
than the average level of the existing workers.
Outside the service sector, the construction industry, and to a lesser extent the
manufacturing industry, also made significant contributions to the 1980s slowdown.
Working in the other direction, faster rates of productivity growth in electricity, gas3
and water, communications and transport and storage acted to push up productivity
growth. These favourable effects were, however, more than offset by developments
in other sectors.
The industry data also provide some insight into the relationships between relative
productivity performance and wage outcomes. Under enterprise bargaining
arrangements, wage increases for individual enterprises and industries are
increasingly justified in terms of the individual firm’s or industry’s productivity
performance. Such a relationship between productivity growth and wages has an
obvious appeal. Ultimately, however, differential rates of productivity growth
between industries do not appear to lead to substantially different rates of increases
in wages across industries. Instead, differences in productivity growth affect relative
prices; slow productivity growth in hairdressing does not lead to stagnant real
wages for hairdressers, but instead to an increase in the relative price of a haircut.
The examination of the wage data also suggests that real output growth in the
finance, property and business services sector has been significantly
underestimated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines trends in
labour-productivity growth over the period from March 1978 to June 1994 and the
contribution of various industries to changes in labour-productivity growth.2 Section
3 then analyses productivity trends in the wholesale and retail trade, recreation,
personal and other services and construction sectors. Section 4 follows with an
examination of the interactions among wages, productivity and prices using
industry-level data. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and concluding remarks.
2. TRENDS IN LABOUR-PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
In analysing trends in labour-productivity growth, the traditional measure of labour
input is hours worked. While this is the appropriate measure for assessing the
average output produced per hour worked, it ignores the fact that unemployed
workers are producing no measured output. If these unemployed workers find jobs,
this is likely to slow productivity growth as, on average, the new workers will be
producing less output than the existing workers. In contrast, output per potential
worker may be growing quite strongly. This appears to have been the case in the
second half of the 1980s. Figure 2 shows an index of output per potential worker
(where the potential  workforce is equal to the labour supply). This labour-
productivity series is more volatile than the one presented in Figure 1 as it does not
adjust for the decline in labour input in recessions. More importantly, this series
also shows a much better productivity performance between 1982 and 1989. While
                                               
2 The choice of time period is governed by the availability of data on hours worked by industry.4
declining unemployment contributed to the slowdown in growth in the standard
measure of labour productivity, the slowdown does not necessarily imply a decline
in the rate at which average living standards were improving.
Figure 2: Output Per Potential Worker
(March quarter 1978 = 100)















While swings in the business cycle have a pronounced effect on output per potential
worker, they also affect the standard measure of output per hour worked. In
recessions, labour productivity tends to decline as firms are reluctant to lose
workers who have firm-specific knowledge. In the recovery, this ‘labour hoarding’
means that labour productivity can increase quite quickly. The existence of
increasing returns to scale may accentuate this cyclical influence. While taking
account of these cyclical influences is important, there is no standard method by
which this is done. The approach adopted here is to use the recession troughs as the
break dates for splitting the sample into three subperiods. At best, this is only a
partial solution as neither the starting nor end points of the entire sample are
recession troughs. Even if they were, differences in the nature of recessions may
lead to differences in productivity performance over different business cycles.
Table 1 presents labour-productivity growth rates for each industry over the various
sub-periods and Figure 3 shows the  level of labour productivity in the March5
quarter of 1978 and the June quarter of 1994. The ASIC industry classifications are
used.3
Table 1: Labour-Productivity Growth Rates by Industry
(Per cent per annum)
1978:1-1983:1 1983:1-1991:2 1991:2-1994:21978:1-1994:2
Mining -3.01 6.44 1.42 2.52
Manufacturing 2.41 1.89 2.53 2.16
Utilities 1.00 7.68 5.19 5.13
Construction 2.70 -1.45 -0.98 -0.10
Wholesale and retail trade 1.01 -0.10 2.31 0.68
Transport and storage -0.55 1.81 5.63 1.77
Communications 6.07 6.96 12.89 7.76
Finance, property and 0.02 -1.37 -0.97 -0.87
   business services
Public administration and
   defence 0.70 1.31 2.17 1.28
Community services 0.64 0.45 2.89 0.96
Recreation, personal and -0.50 -1.83 1.49 -0.81
   other services
Non-farm sector 1.34 0.68 2.51 1.21
Data on hours worked by industry are obtained from the Labour Force Survey.4 This
is a survey of individuals and provides industry-level hours worked data from 1978
onwards. Data from a similar survey of firms (the Survey of Employment and
Earnings) were first published in September 1983. At least for data on total
employment, the Labour Force Survey is preferred by the ABS.5 While the general
trends in the two surveys are similar, the Survey of Employment and Earnings has
shown weaker employment growth over recent years. At the industry level,
                                               
3 In August 1994, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) switched from the Australian
Standard Industrial Classification (ASIC) to the Australian and New Zealand Standard
Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) system. This change has led to some alterations in the
definition of industries. Since at the time of writing, historical data under the ANZSIC
definitions are only available from December 1984, this paper predominantly uses data based
on the ASIC industry definitions. In some cases in the industry studies, ASIC data are used in
conjunction with ANZSIC data. Attempts have been made to ensure that the data are as
comparable as possible.
4 Hours-worked data are calculated by multiplying employment by average hours worked. The
employment data are seasonally adjusted by the ABS. The hours-worked data are seasonally
adjusted using the X11 procedure and then a centred (Henderson) moving average is applied
to the seasonally-adjusted data.
5 See ABS Cat. No. 6248.0.6
differences between the two surveys can help explain some of the anomalies in the
industry labour-productivity data (see below).
Figure 3: Labour Productivity by Industry









































Note: Output at average 1989/90 prices.
There are clearly large differences across industries in both growth rates and levels
of labour productivity. In the communications sector, labour productivity increased
at nearly 8 per cent per year between 1978 and 1994, while labour productivity fell
at almost 1 per cent per year in the finance, property and business services and the
recreation, personal and other services sectors. In terms of levels, in the June
quarter of 1994, labour productivity in the mining industry (the sector with the
highest level of labour productivity) was almost 5.5 times that in the recreation,
personal and other services industry (the sector with the lowest level of labour
productivity).
In a number of industries there is an important issue concerning the measurement of
output and thus productivity. The most frequently cited measurement problems are
in the non-market sectors – public administration and defence, finance, property and
business services and community services – where it is difficult to obtain the direct
market value of output. In public administration and defence, annual estimates are
derived by extrapolating base year output by the sum of deflated estimates of
wages, salaries and supplements and constant price estimates of consumption of7
fixed capital.6 With public service average wages rising more quickly than public
service pay rates (due to an increase in the average classification level of public
servants) measured labour-productivity growth has been positive. To the extent that
a higher average classification represents a higher average skill level, it is consistent
with rising labour productivity. More problematic is the notion that an increase in
the pay rate of a particular classification represents an increase in the ‘price’ of the
output, rather than an increase in output produced per hour worked. Similar issues
arise in the community services industry.
In the finance, property and business services sector, output in the base year is
extrapolated using data on hours worked.7 This is based on the assumption that
there is zero labour-productivity growth. Despite this, on the measure presented
above, labour productivity does change in these industries. While  compositional
effects play some role in explaining this change, differences in the Labour Force
Survey (LFS) and the Survey of Employment and Earnings (SEE) are also
important.
Since September 1983, the ABS have used the SEE to extrapolate output in this
sector. Figure 4 shows the ratio of finance, property and business services sector
employment, as measured by the SEE, to employment as measured by the LFS.8 It
shows that changes in labour productivity, as measured in this paper, are almost
entirely explained by changes in this ratio. Thus if the SEE measure of labour input
is used in the productivity calculations, there is no decline in productivity. While in
the medium term, the two measures of labour input might be expected to behave
similarly, substantial deviations appear to persist for some time. In analysing the
differences in the two measures, the ABS states that in the upswing of the
employment cycle the (aggregate) SEE series will lag the LFS series due to delays
in updating the business register. The increasing use of contract labour in the
finance, property and business services sector may also be contributing to the
differences.
                                               
6 Quarterly estimates are derived by interpolating the annual estimates with estimates of hours
worked (see ABS Cat. No. 5243.0).
7 This procedure was also used for the 1984/85 base-year estimate for public administration and
defence.
8 The ratio has been rebased to 100 in March 1985. The ABS state that ‘if the incidence of
multiple job-holding, labour turnover and part-time working remains fixed over time, the
estimates of movement in employment provided by the two series are, in concept, the same.’
(ABS Cat. No. 5211.0, 1989/90, p. 18:33).8
Figure 4: Labour Productivity and Measures of Labour Input for
Finance, Property and Business Services
(March quarter 1985 = 100)













Other measurement problems, particularly in service industries, arise due to the
difficulty in measuring the quality of output. While the statistician makes
adjustments to price indices for the improvement in the quality of goods, such
adjustments are typically not made for improvements in the quality of services.
Whether or not such adjustments should be made is a matter for debate. For
example, if shops are open longer hours, providing an increased level of
convenience, should some adjustment be made to the price deflator for the retail
industry? Should adjustments be made for improvements in quality of service in
hotels and restaurants? There are no clear, easily implementable answers to these
questions. However, these issues do suggest a deal of caution in concluding that a
slowdown in measured labour-productivity growth necessarily implies a slowdown
in the march forward of living standards.
Notwithstanding these measurement problems, we now turn to examining the role
that particular industries play in driving the aggregate productivity numbers. The
aggregate level of labour productivity can be expressed as a weighted average of
productivity in each industry, where the weight for a particular industry is that












where Y is aggregate output, L is aggregate labour input and Yi and Li are output
and labour input in industry i.
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The first component measures the contribution to the change in aggregate labour
productivity made by productivity improvements within each industry. The second
component measures the contribution made by workers shifting between industries.
One weakness of this accounting approach is that the two components may not be
independent. A sector that has a higher than average level of labour productivity
may further increase labour productivity by firing any workers with low marginal
product. This would be recorded as an increase in within-sector productivity, as
well as a decrease caused by the movement of labour out of an industry with a high
average level of productivity. The problem arises because the marginal product of
the average and marginal workers may be quite different. This hints at a second and
related problem – while average labour-productivity levels differ considerably
across sectors, the differences in labour productivity of the marginal worker are
likely to be much smaller. Thus, the relatively small compositional effects identified
below are likely to be upper estimates of the true size of compositional effects at
least at this level of aggregation.10
Figure 5: Contributions from  Figure 6: Contributions from
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We now turn to the decomposition suggested by equation (2), and examine the
contributions to aggregate labour-productivity growth made by various industries in
each of the three periods defined in Table 1. For each period, Figure 5 shows the
annual change in labour productivity in each sector, multiplied by the sector’s share
in total employment – the first component of equation (2). Figure 6 shows the
second component of equation (2) – the contribution to productivity growth from
the movement of labour between sectors. Figure 7 shows the share of total hours
worked in each of the industries in March 1978 and June 1994. The biggest changes
have been an increase in the employment shares of finance, property and business
services and community services and a decline in manufacturing’s share.11
Figure 7: Shares of Total Hours Worked
































2.1 The Slowdown in Labour-Productivity Growth From 1983
After growing at an annual rate of 1.34 per cent between March 1978 and
March 1983, labour productivity in the non-farm sector grew at just 0.68 per cent
per annum between March 1983 and June 1991. Figure 5 and Table 1 show that this
slowdown did not occur in all industries, with a number of industries increasing
their contribution to aggregate labour-productivity growth. Most notable amongst
these was the mining sector, with labour-productivity growth increasing from -3 per
cent per annum, to around 61/2 per cent per annum; this added 0.16 of a percentage
point to annual aggregate productivity growth.
Of the industries contributing to the slowdown, the construction industry made the
largest contribution. Had productivity growth in this industry been maintained at the
rate that was achieved between March 1978 and March 1983, annual aggregate
labour-productivity growth would have been 0.35 of a percentage point faster in the
1983-91 period. The slowdown in labour-productivity growth in manufacturing
contributed a further 0.18 of a percentage point to the aggregate slowdown. In total,
the slowdown in measured productivity growth in the five service sectors
contributed 0.45 of a percentage point.12
Within the service sector, wholesale and retail trade made the largest contribution.
The slowdown in this sector, from an already slow growth rate, took around one-
quarter of a percentage point off aggregate labour-productivity growth, relative to
the 1978-83 period After experiencing average labour-productivity growth of
around 1 per cent per annum between March 1978 and March 1983, the wholesale
and retail trade sector actually recorded negative productivity growth over the
following eight years. By March 1991, the level of labour productivity in the sector
had fallen nearly 11 per cent from its peak reached in March 1984.
The finance, property and business services sector contributed around 0.13 of a
percentage point to the aggregate slowdown. As discussed above, the negative
productivity growth in this sector reflects differences in the Labour Force Survey
and the Survey of Employment and Earnings. Between 1983 and 1991, the level of
labour productivity also fell in the recreation, personal and other services sector. In
fact, this sector experienced the largest fall of any industry; the level of labour
productivity falling over 14 per cent between March 1983 and June 1991. The
deterioration in the productivity performance in this sector contributed almost 0.1 of
a percentage point per annum to the overall slowdown.
As noted above, the slowdown in productivity growth in the mid 1980s did not
occur in all industries – in addition to the mining sector, the utilities, transport and
storage and communications industries all made larger contributions to aggregate
labour-productivity growth in the 1983-91 period than they had done in the 1978-83
period. Labour-productivity growth in utilities was 7.7 per cent per year between
March 1983 and June 1991 (1.0 per cent in the earlier period), while labour-
productivity growth in communications was 7.0 per cent (6.1 per cent), and in
transport and storage it was 1.8 per cent (-0.6 per cent).
In part, the faster productivity growth in these industries reflected the
microeconomic reforms that were taking place.9 To some degree, the low
productivity growth in the manufacturing, construction and wholesale and retail
trade industries has hidden the macroeconomic benefits of these  microeconomic
reforms. Not only has the improved performance of sectors that provide important
inputs made an indirect impact on the competitiveness of Australian business, but it
has also made a significant direct contribution to aggregate labour-productivity
growth. Had the productivity growth of these sectors (utilities, communications and
transport and storage) been unchanged from the rate that was achieved between
March 1978 and March 1983, aggregate labour-productivity growth between 1983
and 1991 would have been at least 0.3 of a percentage point slower than the already
low level that was actually experienced.
                                               
9 For a discussion of the impact of recent microeconomic reforms on productivity see Filmer
and Dao (1994).13
Finally, an examination of Figure 6 suggests that at the level of aggregation used in
this section of the paper, the movement of labour between sectors played only a
very small role in explaining the productivity growth slowdown. In the period
between March 1978 and March 1983, the movement of labour between sectors
added just over 0.1 of a percentage point to annual labour-productivity growth. This
compares with a zero contribution over the period from March 1983 to June 1991.
In both periods, the growth of employment in the relatively low-productivity
community services industry acted to retard aggregate labour-productivity growth.
This was offset by the employment growth in the relatively high-productivity
finance, property and business service sector. The impact of these effects was,
however, quite small. The major difference between the two periods is the decline
in the latter period in the employment shares of the mining and utilities industries
which have relatively high labour productivity.
2.2 The Pick-up in Labour-Productivity Growth Since 1991
Since mid 1991, the growth rate of labour productivity has increased considerably –
averaging 2.5 per cent per annum between June 1991 and June 1994. This
improvement has been widespread, with most industries experiencing a pick-up in
productivity growth. While in the construction and the finance, property and
business services sectors, labour productivity has continued to decline, it has done
so at a slower pace. In contrast, the levels of labour productivity in wholesale and
retail trade and recreation, personal and other services industries have risen over
recent years.
The sector that has made the largest contribution to the turn-around in aggregate
productivity performance is the wholesale and retail trade sector – it accounts for
around half of a percentage point of the increase in the growth rate. Together, the
transport and storage and communications industries have contributed a further 0.3
of a percentage point to the pick-up in aggregate labour-productivity growth. A
considerable contribution has also been made by the community services industry
(0.45 of a percentage point).
While the movement of labour between sectors has had a larger impact on
productivity growth than was previously the case, the role remains relatively small
(see Figure 6). The declines in employment shares of the high-productivity utilities
and communications industries have contributed negatively to aggregate labour-
productivity growth. In total, the effect of the movement of labour between sectors
has been to subtract nearly 0.2 of a percentage point per annum from aggregate
labour-productivity growth (compared with zero, in the previous period). However,
as mentioned earlier, the within-sector productivity contributions may not be
independent of the contribution made by movements of labour between sectors. In14
particular, while in an accounting sense, the fall in relative employment in the high-
productivity utilities industry has resulted in a direct decline in overall productivity,
the fall in employment was probably important in generating the rapid increases in
labour productivity within the sector.
Does the increase in labour-productivity growth represent a fundamental change
from the 1980s experience or is it just a one-time adjustment in productivity levels
and/or the result of a cyclical upswing?
The top panel of Figure 8 presents indices of labour productivity for the non-farm
sector around the time of the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s.10 The
zero point on the time line represents the trough of the recession. The bottom panel
shows analogous indices for real non-farm GDP. For the first two years of recovery,
labour-productivity growth is similar in the two episodes – increasing at nearly 3 per
cent per year. This is despite the fact that in the most recent episode, output growth
was considerably slower. In terms of productivity growth, the real difference
appears in the third year. In the episode of the early 1980s, labour productivity
reached its peak ten quarters after the trough of the recession and then was basically
flat for seven years. In the current recovery, labour productivity has continued to
increase and, in relative terms, is now considerably above where it was at the same
time in the previous cycle. In contrast, non-farm output has not yet increased to the
same extent as was the case in the early 1980s.
                                               
10 The GDP(A) series is used here. The data period has been extended to include the December
quarter 1994.15
Figure 8: Productivity and Output Out of Recessions














































 Panel B: NF GDP(A); indexed from trough in output
It is tempting to cite this recent difference in productivity growth as the first sign of
a structural change in the underlying rate of productivity growth. However, it is
clearly too early to make a definitive judgment on whether such a change has
occurred. Explaining, let alone predicting, changes in productivity trends is
notoriously difficult. There are, however, a number of factors that give cause for
optimism. First, ongoing  microeconomic reform and the competitive pressures
induced by the increased internationalisation of the economy should help deliver
continuing productivity improvements.11 The implementation of the Hilmer reforms,
which the Industry Commission estimate will add around 51/2 per cent per annum to
real GDP, is also a positive factor for future productivity growth.
                                               
11 See Ergas and Wright (1994) for evidence that internationalisation has affected the
performance of firms in the manufacturing industry.16
Second, real wages should not need to fall as they did after the wages push of the
early 1980s. To some extent, the early-1980s recession was the result of an
unsustainably large increase in real wages – this was not the case in the early-1990s
recession. An implication of this is that as demand increases, real wages,
productivity and employment should all increase. As the cycle progresses, declining
unemployment rates may well be associated with declining productivity growth, but
with real wages growing, a repeat of the stagnant productivity of the second half of
the 1980s experience is unlikely.
Third, as the following discussion argues, the measured performance of the
wholesale and retail trade industry should be considerably better than in the 1980s.
Most of the adjustment to the deregulation of shopping hours has been completed,
so that the adoption of new technologies and more efficient forms of retailing should
contribute to aggregate productivity growth.
Fourth, as Baily (1993) argues, the electronics revolution of the past decade has
soaked up a lot of resources, as companies have computerised their workplaces and
come to grips with the new technology. We may now be on the verge of reaping
more fully the gains from this investment. David (1990) argues that the small
productivity gains that western countries have so far seen from computerisation are
analogous to the small initial gains from the invention of the electric dynamo at the
end of the previous century. In that case, large productivity gains were not realised
until new industrial facilities, organisational structures and complementary
technologies were developed. In the current context, it is difficult to predict exactly
when, and to what extent, the benefits of the recent investment in computers and
information technology will show up in the productivity numbers. Nevertheless, it is
probable that in the next five years substantial benefits will accrue.
While the magnitude and timing of these various factors is uncertain, collectively
they provide a basis for believing that labour productivity growth will continue at a
reasonable pace for the remainder of the current decade. As growth in GDP slows,
some slowing of productivity growth is inevitable, but a return to the stagnant levels
of labour-productivity experienced in the second half of the 1980s seems unlikely.
3. LABOUR-PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES
Over the business cycle that ran from March 1983 to June 1991, four industries
experienced a decline in the measured level of labour productivity. In the finance,
property and business services sector this decline can largely be explained by
problems with the measurement of labour input (see previous section). This section
analyses productivity outcomes in the other three sectors: two service industries –17
wholesale and retail trade and recreation, personal and other services – and the
construction industry.
3.1 The Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry
The wholesale and retail trade industry is the largest industry in Australia. In 1994,
it accounted for nearly 18 per cent of total output in the non-farm economy (nearly
20 per cent if the ownership of dwellings, import duties and imported bank service
charges are excluded) and for about 22 per cent of total hours worked.
Figure 9 shows output per hour worked in the industry over the period from March
1978 to June 1994. Labour productivity is clearly pro-cyclical; falling in recessions
and increasing in booms. Perhaps more importantly, the trend rate of productivity
growth appeared to change in the mid 1980s. After output per hour worked
increased by around 1 per cent a year from 1978 to 1983, it fell, on average, by
around 0.1 per cent a year over the following eight years.12 More
Figure 9: Labour Productivity in the Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry
(March quarter 1978 = 100)














                                               
12 Between 1966/67 and 1978/79 output per person employed in the industry increased at
around 1.6 per cent per year.18
recently, labour-productivity growth has again been positive. Despite the recent
rise, labour productivity in June 1994 had still not reached its previous peak in
March 1984.
While comparable data for other countries are scarce, the low productivity growth
in the wholesale and retail trade industry appears to be unusual by international
standards.13 The OECD publishes data on total-factor productivity for different
sectors for member countries (Meyer Zu  Schlochtern and  Meyer Zu  Schlochtern
1994). Unfortunately, the data for wholesale and retail trade also include the output
of the hotels and restaurants sector (which under the ASIC classification system is
included in the recreation, personal and other services sector). The data show that
between 1970 and 1989, total-factor-productivity growth in this sector in Australia
was -0.34 per cent per annum. This performance was worse than that in any other
country for which data are published – on average, across the 13 countries, total
productivity growth in the sector was 0.8 per cent per annum.14
In light of the international experience, and given the perception that there has been
substantial technological innovation in the distributive trades over the past decade,
the fall in labour productivity is surprising. The use of scanning devices and
computer-operated stock control systems have become common place. Stores have
become larger and many firms have rationalised their operations. Despite these
changes, the average worker in June 1994 was processing slightly fewer goods per
working hour than a worker ten years ago. We now examine why this is so.
3.1.1 Measurement issues
Firms in the distribution industry provide three core outputs: (i) distribution of
goods; (ii) product information; and (iii) convenience or the minimising of
transaction costs. (Some might argue that they also provide entertainment.)15 In
obtaining an estimate of the growth rate of output for the industry, statistical
agencies typically only consider the first of these outputs. In Australia, in the
                                               
13 One source is OECD (1992). This report examines the change in the structure of the
distribution industry in seven OECD countries (Australia is not included).
14 A series of reports published by the OECD suggest that, in a range of countries,
labour-productivity growth in the distributive trades was between 1 and 2 per cent in the
1980s (see Betancourt (1993), Dawson (1993), Lachner, Tager and Weitzel (1993),
Maruyama (1993), Messerlin (1993), Pellegrini and Cardani (1993) and Wibe(1993)). For the
United States, both the Bureau of Labour Studies and the Bureau of Economic Activity
estimate that output per hour worked in retailing increased by more than 1 per cent per year
between 1977 and 1986. However, over this period labour productivity in food stores fell by
7 per cent (see Baily and Gordon (1988)).
15 Oi (1992) argues that retail firms also engage in repackaging and supply ancillary services
such as delivery and credit.19
wholesale industry, base-year output for six industry groups is extrapolated by
constant price estimates of wholesalers’ sales in each industry group. In the retail
industry, base-year output for 16 industry groups is extrapolated by constant price
estimates of industry retail turnover. This methodology assumes that output is a
fixed proportion of turnover for each industry group. As such, it only takes account
of the ‘distribution’ output of the sector, ignoring the supply of product information
and the provision of convenience. Given current measurement practices, changes in
the quality of service, opening hours, the extent of product information and the
quality of the shopping environment do not lead to changes in output.
There are two principal sources of data on measured output and labour input for the
wholesale and retail trade industries. The first is the periodic censuses of the retail
industry and surveys of the wholesale industry carried out by the ABS. For retail
trade, a census has been conducted every five or so years since 1948.16 For
wholesale trade, the most recent surveys were conducted in 1981/82 and 1991/92.
The second source is that used above for the calculation of industry
labour-productivity indices  – that is, quarterly output data from the national
accounts and labour input from the Labour Force Survey. The census/survey data
provide comprehensive snap-shots at particular points in time, while the national
accounts provide time-series data.
Unfortunately, the two sources present quite different pictures. The quarterly data
show that in the second half of the 1980s, labour productivity fell in both the
wholesale and retail industries, with the fall being more pronounced in the
wholesale industry (see Figure 10). This is at odds with the results from the
Wholesale Industry Surveys and the Retail Censuses. Data from the survey of
wholesalers show that real turnover increased by 19 per cent between 1981/82 and
1991/92, while employment fell by 4 per cent; implying an increase in turnover per
person of some 23 per cent. Over the same time period, the national accounts data
show an increase in output in the wholesale sector of around 8 per cent, and the
Labour Force Survey shows an increase in employment of 19 per cent (and an
increase in hours worked of 23 per cent). This implies a fall in output per person of
15 per cent between 1981/82 and 1991/92.17 In retailing the contrast is less marked.
The census data appear to show slightly slower productivity growth than do the
national accounts/labour force survey data, although a complete assessment is made
difficult due to changes in industry definitions brought about by the switch from
ASIC to ANZSIC classifications.
                                               
16 The 1991/92 census, which is known as the Retail and Services Census, also included certain
service industries. In the present paper, this census is simply referred to as the Retail Census.
17 In part, this difference may reflect the fact that the 1991/92 Wholesale Industry Survey sought
data on ‘management units’, while the earlier survey sought data on ‘establishments’. In the
latter survey, businesses whose primary activity was not wholesaling were excluded.20
3.1.2 The wholesale industry
If the survey data are correct, then labour-productivity growth in wholesaling was
considerably higher than that suggested by Figure 10. Table 2 presents employment
and turnover data from the Wholesale Industry Survey for various sub-categories of
wholesale trade. It shows that in 1991/92, almost two-thirds of total employment in
wholesaling was in sub-sectors that supply investment goods (the first four
categories). This explains much of the cyclicality of the industry. In all sub-sectors,
with the exception of machinery and equipment, employment actually fell over the
ten years to June 1992. Perhaps more importantly, the data show that in all but one
sub-sector, real turnover per person increased between 1981/82 and 1991/92. The
increase was particularly large in minerals, metals and chemicals, where labour
productivity increased by 70 per cent over the ten year period. Given the
widespread gains in labour productivity throughout the industry, it seems unlikely
that labour productivity in the industry as a whole could have declined.
Figure 10: Labour Productivity Indices for Retail Trade and
Wholesale Trade
(March quarter 1978 = 100)
















Table 2: The Wholesale Industry (1991/92)









Builders hardware dealers 44,155 6,408 -19.7 20.8
Machinery and equipment 102,677 17,616 4.9 23.5
Minerals, metals and
  chemicals 31,012 24,438 -20.7 70.7
Farm properties and
  produce 19,565 7,954 -14.9 -6.1
Food, drink and tobacco 43,466 14,516 -14.8 3.1
Textile and clothing 14,875 3,076 -9.3 6.7
Household goods 12,977 3,235 -26.3 28.6
Other specialists 39,524 7,874 -0.1 34.2
Notes: (a) Nominal turnover data have been deflated by the implicit price  deflator for the
wholesale industry.
  (b) ASIC and ANZSIC data have been used to construct the percentage changes. The
differences in the definitions are relatively minor with a couple of exceptions. In the
builders hardware dealers category, building completion services are not included in 
the data for 1991/92 (in 1991/92 this sector accounted for around 7 per cent of sub-
sector employment).The machinery and equipmentcategory excludes motor vehicles 
wholesalers in both periods.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 8638.0, 1981/82 and 1991/92.
3.1.3 The retail industry
Stores selling food account for the largest share of employment in the retail industry
(see Table 3). Food stores have also been the source of the fastest jobs growth
within retailing, with the number of jobs increasing by 22 per cent between 1986
and 1992. Employment in stores selling bread and cakes grew particularly strongly,
increasing nearly 140 per cent over the six year period, while the number of
establishments increased by nearly 90 per cent.18 Employment growth was also very
rapid in takeaway food retailing (up 41 per cent). Outside the food industry,
employment grew quickly in stores selling domestic hardware and housewares (up
43 per cent) and in stores selling newspapers, books and stationary (up 28 per cent)
(see Appendix A).
Value added per employee tends to be highest in those sub-sectors selling high-
value goods such as furniture and motor vehicles. According to data published from
the 1985/86 Retail Census, value added per employee in these sub-sectors is about
                                               
18 In part, this growth stems from the deregulation of baking hours in the mid 1980s.22
three times that in the sub-sector with the lowest value added per employee (milk
bars and take away stores). While large differences exist in the level of labour
productivity between sectors, international evidence suggests that large differences
also exist within sub-sectors.
In general, one of the most significant determinants of the level of labour
productivity for a given class of store is the size of the store. In a comprehensive
comparison of retailing productivity in Britain, the United States and Germany,
Smith and Hitchens (1985) conclude that, in all three countries, labour productivity
increases with shop size, where size is measured by turnover. They attribute much
of the superiority of retail productivity in the US to the larger size of shops in that
country. A similar conclusion is reached by Baily (1993) who attributes the large
size of shops in the United States to relatively weak zoning regulation, few
restrictions on shopping hours and a well-developed private transport system. An
OECD study into the distribution systems of a variety of countries (OECD 1992)
concludes that average sales per employee tend to be 50 to 80 per cent higher in the
largest class of stores than the smallest, with value added per employee being as
much as 100 per cent higher. The study also reports work by Noyelle (1990) which
concludes that in France, the shift to larger stores between 1980 and 1986
contributed over 1 per cent per annum to labour-productivity growth in retailing (out
of a total labour-productivity growth in the sector of 2.4 per cent per annum).
As Table 3 shows, this shift to larger stores has also occurred in Australia. The
increases have been particularly pronounced for supermarkets and stores selling
furniture, housewares and appliances. In both cases, the average sizes of stores
increased by over 20 per cent between 1986 and 1992. In most cases, real turnover
has not increased as quickly, so that turnover per square metre has fallen.
Not only has the physical size of stores increased, but so too has the number of
employees per store. In 1980, on average, 5.5 people worked at each retail location.
By 1992, this had increased to 6.2 people. In part, this increase is due to the growth
of part-time employment, with the number of full-time employees per location
actually falling. The increase in the size of businesses can also be seen in the
number of ‘small’ and ‘large’ businesses (small businesses are those that employ
fewer than 20 people);between 1980 and 1992 the number of small businesses
increased by 18 per cent, while the number of large businesses rose by 32 per cent
(Kiel and Haberkern 1994).23
























  grocery 179,619 6.6 560 23.3 4,918 5.4 145,269 8.9
Specialised food 238,028 37.0 105 11.2 3,294 -5.0 63,581 -18.7
Total food 417,647 22.0 186 10.9 4,164 1.0 98,713 -6.2
Department
  stores 86,576 -9.7 9,084 3.1 2,508 -10.5 113,172 3.5
Clothing and
  soft goods 91,653 8.9 152 12.0 2,597 -5.0 94,891 -1.3
Furniture,
  housewares
  appliances 72,503 23.7 401 20.2 2,072 -8.8 163,869 0.2
Recreational
  goods 56,297 17.8 155 4.6 3,323 1.6 113,168 -6.0
Other personal
  and household
  goods 111,026 39.4 169 8.8 1,955 1.5 82,909 4.1
Total personal
  and household
  goods 427,688 14.2 248 8.4 2,331 -7.1 108,626 -0.1
Motor vehicle
  retailing
  and services 215,198 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 203,040 n.a.
Note:Turnover is in average 1989/90 prices.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 8623.1.
Despite the increase in store size and the adoption of new technologies, measured
labour productivity in the retail industry has fallen.19 As is the case for the economy
as a whole, changes in labour productivity within a particular sector can,
theoretically, be decomposed into changes due to compositional shifts and changes
due to increases in labour productivity within sub-sectors. Unfortunately, detailed
data on output and hours worked by sub-sector of retailing are not published. In
their place, data from the 1985/86 and 1991/92 Retail Census can be used to obtain
                                               
19 The fall is less pronounced when data from the 1984/85 base-year national accounts are used.
The ABS attributes the difference in the 1984/85 and 1989/90 base-year accounts to a change
in the method used to calculate value added of truck retailers (see ABS Cat. No. 5243.0).24
a rough estimate of the effect of compositional shifts. These data suggest that had
the employment structure that existed at the time of the 1991/92 Census existed in
1985/86, value added per employee in 1985/86 would have been up to 2 percentage
points lower.
The single most important contributor to this negative compositional effect is the
expansion of the fast food industry (milk bars and take-away stores); over the
six years between the Retail Censuses, the share of total hours (in food and personal
and household good retailing) worked in this sub-sector increased by about
5 percentage points to around 17 per cent. With value added per hour worked in this
sub-sector (in 1985/86) being roughly 60 per cent of the average, this change of 5
percentage points in employment shares contributed almost 2 percentage points to
the decline in retail industry productivity. An additional 1 percentage point was
contributed by the contraction of hours worked in department stores, as these stores
tend to have higher than average levels of labour productivity. The rapid expansion
of relatively low-productivity bread stores also contributed to the slowdown.
While compositional effects may explain part of the poor productivity outcomes,
they can provide no more than a partial explanation, as labour productivity appears
to have fallen in a wide range of different types of stores. A comparison of the
1985/86 and 1991/92 Retail Censuses, shows that in 15 out of the 25 sub-sectors
for which comparative data are available, turnover per employee fell; the largest
falls being recorded in retail stores selling marine equipment, takeaway food, bread
and cakes, liquor and floor coverings (see Appendix 1). A similar picture emerges
when disaggregated quarterly retail trade turnover data are examined.
Why did turnover per employee fall in such a wide range of retail stores in the
second half of the 1980s? One possible answer is the spread of part-time
employment – workers who work fewer hours process fewer goods through the
check-out. Certainly, the share of part-time employment did increase more quickly
in the second half of the 1980s than it did over the first half of the decade. Over the
1980s as a whole, the ratio of employment to hours worked in the industry
increased by about 4 per cent. This suggests that even if an adjustment is made to
take account of a reduction in average hours, labour productivity in a variety of
stores would still have fallen.
The strongest candidate for explaining the slow labour-productivity growth in
retailing is the deregulation of trading hours. While deregulation has occurred at
different rates in different States, stores in all states are now open for longer hours
than was the case in 1980. For the 30 years following World War II, shopping hours
were heavily regulated with most shops opening for around 48 hours per week. By
the end of the 1970s, all States had introduced late night shopping on one or two
nights per week. This had the effect of increasing average opening hours a little, to25
just over 50 hours per week in 1980. Nevertheless, opening hours still remained
heavily regulated.
In New South Wales, the regulations began to be eroded in late 1984 when shops
were permitted to trade on Friday nights and Saturday afternoons. The success of
these longer hours saw increasing pressure for further deregulation, which finally
came in 1989 when unrestricted trading hours on Monday to Saturday were
introduced. While regulations concerning Sunday trading remain, they are in large
part ineffective. Deregulation has also occurred in other states, but in most cases the
process has been slower. For example, in Victoria and South Australia, the
extension of Saturday trading to 5:00 p.m. took place in 1987.
Kiel and  Haberkern (1994) estimate that deregulation has led to an increase in
average opening hours in Australia from 52 hours per week in the early 1980s, to 56
hours in 1986 and to 61 in 1992. In New South Wales and the ACT, where
deregulation has been more extensive, they estimate that shops were open for an
average of 66 hours in 1992 – 15 hours a week more than in 1980. These changes
represent an increase of almost 30 per cent in the hours that the average retail store
is open in NSW, and an increase of almost 20 per cent Australia wide.
While unpublished data from the ABS show a slightly smaller increase in average
shopping hours, the increase is nevertheless significant; the data show that in 1992,
the average retail store was open 57 hours. On average, supermarkets were open 75
hours per week; a 12 per cent increase since 1986. Since 1992, hours of operation
of many supermarkets have been extended further with a number of supermarkets
now open 24 hours a day. With the exception of household appliance stores, all
categories of stores recorded longer shopping hours in the 1991/92 Retail Census
than in the 1985/86 Retail Census.
Longer shopping hours have increased shopper convenience and thus have led to an
increase in the broad concept of output of the retail sector. However, it is unlikely
that they have had any substantial effect on the standard measure of output, as
opening stores for longer hours is unlikely to change savings-consumption
decisions. On the other hand, it would be surprising if an increase of nearly 20 per
cent in average opening hours did not require an increase in the number of hours
worked. As a result, longer shopping hours imply a reduction in the average level of
labour productivity. Longer hours may have also contributed to the negative
compositional effects. A good example is bread shops where deregulation of baking
hours has led to a proliferation of specialist bread shops which tend to have low
levels of labour productivity. Working in the opposite direction is the idea that26
deregulation of shopping hours has encouraged the move to larger stores with
higher levels of labour productivity.20
The ‘shopping-hours’ explanation is supported by state-based data on turnover
per person employed in food stores. The data suggest that labour-productivity
growth was slower in those states that undertook the most extensive deregulation of
shopping hours. The shopping hours explanation is further supported by the fact that
the largest declines in labour productivity in the retail sector took place at the same
time that employment was expanding rapidly. Further support is suggested by the
work of Baily and Gordon (1988) who provide a ‘back-of-the-envelope calculation’
of the effect of regulation of shopping hours on labour productivity. They estimate
that if German shopping-hours regulations were applied to the United States, total
GDP might be 5 per cent higher (assuming that the workers ‘released’ from the
retail sector are employed elsewhere in the economy). While this estimate is almost
surely on the high side, Baily and Gordon argue that, at least conceptually, making a
reasonable adjustment for the output of ‘convenience’ might offset all of the
productivity slowdown in US retailing. In reality, however, the extension of
shopping hours in the US considerably predates the productivity slowdown. This is
not the case in Australia.
If this interpretation of events is correct, then measured productivity in the sector
would be increased by re-regulation of shopping hours. This would, however, be an
absurd reaction. Once shopping hours were deregulated, many retailers moved
quickly to extend their hours of operation. Such a move was in response to a clear
public demand for greater flexibility in the timing of shopping.21 This raises an
important issue. Normally slower productivity growth is associated with a slower
rate of increase in conventionally measured living standards. However in this case,
the link between growth and welfare has been weakened. While an evaluation of the
benefits that households received from longer shopping hours is beyond the scope
of this paper, revealed preference says that these benefits may be quite significant.
By not making an adjustment to the quality of the output of the retail sector, the
statistician may have underestimated output and overestimated the price of that
output. On the positive side, given that hours deregulation has already occurred on a
widespread scale, the magnitude of this measurement problem should not grow any
further.
                                               
20 See Morrison and Newman (1983) for Canadian evidence that shopping hours regulation
favours small stores.
21 Not everybody perceived this public demand. In 1983, in one of many reports into the
regulation of shopping hours, Justice Macken wrote: ‘It is blind fantasy to assume that in the
Sydney Metropolitan area there are a significant number of people eager to shop on Saturday
afternoons or on Sundays with respect to goods available to them through the week’
(Macken 1983, p. 53 as cited in Kiel and Haberkern (1994)).27
3.2 The Recreation, Personal and Other Services Industry
The recreation, personal and other services sector plays only a small role in
explaining changes in aggregate labour-productivity growth, but the large fall in the
level of labour productivity makes it an interesting case for study. In 1992, the level
of labour productivity in the industry was only about 80 per cent of the level in
1978. As can be seen from Figure 11, the bulk of this fall occurred between 1984
and 1991. This was also a period of very rapid employment growth. Over this seven
year period, total hours worked in the sector increased by 40 per cent.
Figure 11: Labour Productivity in Recreation, Personal and Other Services
(output per hour worked, March quarter 1978 = 100)












Using the ASIC data, the industry has three main sub-sectors:
• entertainment and recreation services;
• restaurants, hotels and accommodation services (the ‘hospitality’ sub-sector);
and
• personal and other services.
In 1993, the hospitality industry accounted for 54.8 per cent of total industry
employment (up 3 percentage points over the past ten years) while entertainment
and recreation services and personal and other services accounted for 23.4 and 21.928
per cent respectively (up 0.2 and down 3.1 percentage points respectively).
Separate output data are not published for all three sub-sectors, but output and
hours worked data are available for similar ANZSIC categories since the mid
1980s. Figure 12 shows indices of labour productivity for the relevant categories. In
both cultural and recreational services and accommodation, cafes and restaurants,
the level of labour productivity fell significantly through the second half of the
1980s.
Figure 12: Labour Productivity in the Recreation Sector
(March quarter 1985 = 100)




















In assessing the industry’s overall performance, developments in the hospitality
sector are particularly important, as this sector accounts for over half of the
industry’s employment. The hospitality sector (using the ASIC classification) has
four principal components: accommodation; pubs, bars and taverns; cafes and
restaurants; and licensed clubs. An indication of the importance of these various
sub-sectors and the relative levels of labour productivity can be obtained from the
ABS’s 1991/92 Survey of Hospitality Industries. Similar surveys were also
conducted in 1979/80 and 1986/87.
Table 4 shows the share of part-time and full-time hospitality employment
accounted for by each of these sub-sectors in 1986/87 and 1991/92. It also shows
nominal gross industry product per full-time equivalent worker. Unfortunately,
deflators for the different sub-sectors are not published.29
In terms of employment, the accommodation and restaurant sub-sectors have clearly
been the fastest growing. Cafes and restaurants have increased their share of
part-time employment in the hospitality industry from 31.7 per cent to 39.8 per cent
and their share of full-time employment by two percentage points to 32.7 per cent.
Between 1980 and 1992, the number of businesses operating cafes and restaurants
increased by 73 per cent to 8,741 while employment rose by 202 per cent. The
accommodation sector also enjoyed strong employment growth, with the number of
jobs increasing 92 per cent over this 12-year period. Table 4 suggests that many of
these jobs were full-time jobs, with accommodation’s share of total full-time
employment in the hospitality sector increasing from 25.6 to 30.8 per cent over the
period from June 1987 to June 1992.








1986/87 1991/92 1986/87 1991/92 1986/87 1991/92
Accommodation 25.6 30.8 15.8 16.2 24,882 28,412
Pubs, bars and taverns 26.0 18.7 32.0 25.2 22,543 29,146
Cafes and restaurants 30.7 32.7 31.6 39.8 15,616 20,108
Licensed clubs 17.7 17.9 20.7 18.8 29,284 35,081
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 22,440 26,830
Notes: (a) Full-time equivalent employment is calculated as full-time employment plus half of
     part-time employment.
(b) The measure of output is Gross Industry Product.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 8674.0.
There are quite large differences in the level of productivity between the various
parts of the hospitality sub-sector. Licensed clubs have the highest level of labour
productivity, with cafes and restaurants having the lowest level. Using the data for
1991/92, the level of labour productivity in restaurants and cafes is equal to three-
quarters of the level of labour productivity for the hospitality industry and 57 per
cent of the level of labour productivity in licensed clubs. As a whole, the level of
labour productivity in the hospitality sector is lower than the average for the entire
recreation, personal and other services sector.
At this level of aggregation, differences in productivity levels, together with changes
in the structure of employment appear to have led to relatively large compositional
effects on the sector’s productivity performance. Within the hospitality industry, the
sub-sector with the fastest employment growth has been the lowest labour
productivity sector. If the employment shares that existed in 1991/92 had applied in
1986/87, then the level of labour productivity in the hospitality industry in 1986/8730
would have been around 21/2 per cent lower than was actually the case. While this
calculation only provides a rough estimate of the impact of compositional effects, it
does suggest that, at least in this component of the industry, these effects may be
important.
While the growth of relatively low-labour-productivity industries may have
contributed to low productivity growth for the industry as a whole, it is again
unlikely that compositional effects provide the full explanation. In a number of the
industry’s sub-sectors, the available data suggest that there has been relatively
limited productivity growth. The data in Table 4 suggest that nominal labour
productivity in cafes and restaurants increased by 28.8 per cent over the period
1986/87 to 1991/92. Over this same time period the ‘meals-out’ component of the
CPI increased by 30.2 per cent. Similarly, nominal productivity in pubs, bars and
taverns increased by 29.3 per cent, while the prices of alcoholic beverages
increased by 34.1 per cent.
Low productivity growth of these sectors is also suggested by a comparison of the
results from the 1986/87 Services Industry Survey and the 1979/80 Census of Retail
and Selected Services Industry. These surveys provide estimates of real turnover (in
1986/87 prices) per employee. These estimates are shown in Table 5 as a
percentage of turnover-per-employee in the cafes and restaurant sub-sector in
1979/80.
In cafes and restaurants, real turnover per employee fell by 8.2 per cent over the
seven years to 1987. This fall is partly due to an increase in part-time employment,
but turnover per full-time equivalent worker has also declined. A similar picture
emerges for hotels and licensed clubs. Productivity improvements in hairdressing
also appear to be extremely small, with real turnover per employee barely
increasing over the seven years. Laundries and drycleaners, and especially movie
theatres, appear to have done considerably better.31
Table 5: Turnover Per Employee
1979/80 1986/87
Accommodation 116.2 123.8
Hotels (drinking places) 190.8 178.4
Cafes and restaurants 100.0 91.8
Licensed clubs 163.1 154.3
Hairdressers and beauty salons 60.6 61.0
Laundries and dry cleaners 91.8 97.9
Motion picture theatres    148.8    175.7
Note: Real turnover (in 1986/87 prices) per employee is given as a percentage of real
turnover per employee in cafes and restaurants in 1979/80.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 8650.0.
The evidence suggests that many of the sub-sectors of the industry have not
experienced significant improvements in productivity. In large part, this reflects the
highly labour-intensive and service-oriented nature of these sub-sectors – it is
difficult to make hairdressing a more capital-intensive activity and it is difficult to
substitute capital equipment for waiters in a restaurant. Perhaps, the greatest scope
for ‘technical progress’ in many of these industries is the provision of better quality
service with the same labour input. As in the case of retailing, such improvements
are difficult to capture in the measure of output used in the national accounts.
While the above data do not provide a complete picture, they do suggest that the
declining level of labour productivity in the recreation, personal and other services
sector is the result of both compositional effects and stagnant or declining average
productivity levels in a number of important sub-sectors. This has occurred at the
same time that employment in the sector has grown rapidly – in fact, the periods of
most rapid decline in labour productivity have coincided with the periods of most
rapid employment growth. One explanation for this combination of low productivity
growth and strong employment growth is a decline in the sector’s real product
wage; this allowed firms to employ more workers even though the new workers
were reducing the average level of labour productivity in the industry. We return to
this issue in Section 4.
3.3 The Construction Industry
Between March 1983 and June 1991, output per hour worked in the construction
industry declined at a rate of almost 11/2 per cent per year. This deterioration
followed a long period of relatively solid productivity growth and occurred at the
same time that employment and output were growing particularly rapidly (see
Figure 13). While the decline in productivity is apparent for both private and public32
construction, it is more pronounced in public construction; between March 1983
and June 1991, output per person in private sector construction fell by 5.4 per cent,
while in the public sector, labour productivity fell by 17.7 per cent.
Figure 13: The Construction Industry: Output, Employment
and Labour Productivity
(March quarter 1978 = 100)


















The fall in productivity in public sector construction can be explained, in part, by
compositional effects. After 1984/85 there was a sharp decline in public sector
gross fixed capital expenditure, with the fall in State government expenditure in the
electricity sector being particularly pronounced (see Australian Treasury (1994)).
While we know of no data that provide estimates of value-added for various sub-
sectors of government construction, it is reasonable to assume that value-added in
electricity construction was relatively high, so that the decline in this type of
construction made a direct negative contribution to productivity growth (this is, of
course, not a bad thing). While compositional effects are important for government
construction, they are not the complete answer to the declining productivity in the
construction sector, as the level of productivity in the private sector also fell.
The extent of the deterioration in private sector construction is surprising and is at
odds with data obtained from the Construction Industry Surveys. A comparison of
results from the 1984/85 and 1988/89 surveys shows that over this period, value
added per employee in the private sector increased by around 16 per cent, with
increases experienced in most sub-sectors (see Table 6). The survey data also33
suggest that compositional effects within the private sector play only a small role in
explaining the outcomes. While the share of the non-building construction sector in
total employment fell, the share in another high productivity sub-sector – non-
residential building – rose. The biggest fall was in the employment share of
residential building construction which has a relatively low level of productivity. In
summary, if the 1984/85 employment weights are applied to the 1988/89
productivity data, the level of labour productivity in 1988/89 would have been
higher by slightly more than 1 per cent.










1984/85 1988/89 1984/85 1988/89 1984/85 1988/89
Residential 15.8 13.8 16.1 12.9 29.3 30.0 2.4
Non-residential 15.3 19.2 9.8 12.0 37.9 45.2 19.3
Total building 31.1 33.0 25.9 24.9 29.2 37.3 27.9
Road and bridge 6.5 5.8 3.7 3.0 42.8 53.7 25.5
Other non-building 10.1 7.5 7.0 6.3 35.2 33.5 -4.8
Total non-building 16.7 13.3 10.7 9.4 37.9 40.1 5.8
Trades 52.2 53.7 63.4 65.9 20.0 23.0 15.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 24.3 28.2 16.0
Note:Value added is at average 1984/85 prices.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 8771.0.
In contrast to the survey data, the national accounts shows a decline in private
sector labour productivity of 2.3 per cent between 1984/85 and 1988/89. This
difference stems largely from different rates of increase in output, rather than labour
input. To obtain quarterly estimates of private-sector construction output, the
statistician extrapolates base-year output by various components of gross fixed
capital expenditure on construction by the private sector. This approach assumes
that input prices increase at the same rate as output prices. This approach also
means that any biases in the  deflators for gross fixed capital expenditure on
construction will also affect the measurement of output of the construction sector. It
is difficult to determine to what extent biases exist. Certainly studies in the United
States suggest that the deflators for residential construction are biased upwards due
to the inadequate measurement of improvement of building quality.  Baily and
Gordon (1988) estimate that in the US, the residential construction deflator has been
upward biased by at least 1 per cent per year for the past 30 years. This is reflected
in a pronounced trend decline in productivity in the construction sector. However, it
is unlikely that this provides an explanation for the Australian data, since it would34
require that the systematic mismeasurement of quality became worse in the mid
1980s. There is no obvious reason to believe that this was the case.
There is nevertheless, a question mark over the residential construction deflator,
especially in the second half of the 1980s. Historically, this deflator has increased at
roughly the same rate as the price index for materials used in housing construction;
over the 16 years to September 1986, the dwelling deflator increased at an average
rate of 9.6 per cent per year, while the input price index increased at an average rate
of 9.5 per cent. In contrast, over the three years to September 1989, the output
deflator increased more rapidly than the input price index; 11.3 per cent compared
with 8.7 per cent. The rise in the dwelling deflator also exceeded the rise in the non-
residential building deflator and the engineering construction deflator (7.5 per cent
and 6.1 per cent per annum respectively) and the rise in the household repairs and
maintenance component of the CPI (6.0 per cent per annum).
Why did the dwelling  deflator increase so quickly? One clue lies in the close
correspondence between the dwelling deflator and the Australia-wide price series
for new project homes. This series is available from June 1986, and over that period
it tracks movements in the deflator quite closely. The project home series is derived
from surveys of project home builders, with the ABS asking respondents to exclude
land costs. Despite this, there is some circumstantial evidence that the price series
may be capturing something other than construction costs. The State-based data
show unusually large differences in price increases across States; over the five years
following June 1986, the price of a project home rose by more than 60 per cent in
Sydney and Brisbane, but only by a little more than 20 per cent in Adelaide and by
just over 30 per cent in Perth and Hobart. Such differences are striking, especially
when the inputs that go into a house are traded in an essentially national market, and
their prices increased at very similar rates in all states. In Sydney – which
experienced the country’s fastest increases in project home prices in the late 1980s
– the pattern of prices changes corresponds quite closely to the general increase in
established house prices.
While the builders of project homes may have substantial pricing power in
individual markets, the size of the increase in prices, and the variation across States,
at least raises the possibility that the dwelling deflator may have been overestimated
in the late 1980s. A more comprehensive analysis, however, awaits further research.
In any case, even if the dwelling deflator had increased at the same rate as input
prices, this would still not fully explain the decline in labour productivity in private-
sector construction. A further possible explanation for the slowdown is that the
rapid employment and output growth in the construction industry was associated
with a reduction in the average skill levels of workers in the industry and to less
efficient construction practices. This explanation, however, still has to confront the35
evidence from the Construction Industry Survey which shows solid productivity
growth.
4. WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY
One of the most frequently given explanations for the slowdown in aggregate
productivity growth in the second half of the 1980s is that wages fell relative to the
cost of capital and that this led firms to substitute labour for capital. Certainly after
1982/83, there was a significant decline in the share of GDP going to labour as real
wages and real unit labour costs fell. Over recent times, analysis of the links
between productivity and wages has often stopped with the observation that
aggregate wage restraint led to a slower rate of increase in the capital-labour ratio
and thus to slower labour-productivity growth. However, just as changes in output
at the industry level can offer insights into the productivity issue, so too can sectoral
changes in prices and wages.
The form of the links between wages, prices and productivity growth have long
been debated in Australia. Discussion of the wage decisions made by the
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the 1950s and 1960s
was often centred on the relationship between average productivity growth and the
increase in the aggregate nominal wage.22 At the industry level, analysis of the
various linkages is made difficult by the fact that there is no dominant model in
which to analyse outcomes. In general equilibrium, nominal wages (adjusted for
skill differentials) should be the same in each industry. An increase in productivity,
even if just in one industry, should lead to an increase in wages throughout the
entire economy and, as a result, a change in relative prices and a reallocation of
labour and capital. In practice, the labour market is rarely in equilibrium and
changes in the level of productivity in one sector may influence both the sector’s
relative wage and the ability of the sector to attract resources from other parts of the
economy.
The long time taken to re-establish equilibrium makes it difficult to formulate strong
testable propositions. This difficulty is compounded by Australia’s historically
relatively centralised wage-fixation system, which created the possibility that, at
least for a period of time, real wage increases were not directly tied to labour-
productivity growth. This was particularly important in the 1980s. Over this period,
real wages fell in a number of industries. This was not solely an outcome of the
productivity performance of those sectors, but also reflected a decision by policy
makers to achieve employment growth by reducing real wages; using the industry
                                               
22 See the debate between Russell (1965) and Whitehead (1963, 1966). I am indebted to Glenn
Withers for this historical perspective.36
data, there is quite a strong negative correlation between productivity growth and
growth in hours worked.
Even if the labour market was always in equilibrium, there are still no definitive
predictions about changes in the sectoral allocation of labour and capital in response
to productivity improvements in a particular sector. If one sector has an
improvement in its technology, it may attract more workers and more capital, but it
is also possible for that sector to lose both capital and labour. The loss of jobs in an
industry undergoing relatively rapid productivity improvements is more likely if the
underlying technical change is biased against labour, demand growth is weak and
there are limited opportunities to substitute labour for capital. However, in general
equilibrium, any labour made redundant by technological change is re-employed
elsewhere in the economy in response to a change in relative factor costs. As
discussed above, this equilibrium might be a long time in coming. A more difficult
issue is what happens when technological change reduces the demand for a certain
type of worker. If real wages for these workers fall, the level of employment in
general equilibrium may well be lower if the new wage is below the workers’
reservation wage.
In the following discussion an eclectic view is taken and it is argued that the
evidence suggests that the links between wages and productivity have worked in
both directions. Relatively high labour-productivity growth in some sectors has
resulted in nominal wage increases in those sectors greater than average wage
increases. In contrast, in other industries, the real wage restraint of the 1980s
substantially reduced real product wages, and this allowed firms to take on more
workers than would have otherwise been the case. On average, these workers
produced less output than the existing workers and this reduced labour-productivity
growth. This is particularly important in the recreation, personal and other services
sector, and to a lesser extent in the wholesale and retail trade and construction
sectors.
4.1 Productivity, Wages, Prices and the Mismeasurement of Output Growth
To discuss the relationship between measured productivity growth, wages and
prices we start with a simple economy-wide production function. Real output, Y, is
produced with capital, K, and labour, L, using the following constant returns to
scale technology:
Y = AKaL 1-a (3)
With fixed capital and labour, the rate of increase in real output equals the rate of
technological progress:37
ˆ  Y = ˆ  A  (4)
where ^ denotes percentage change.
The rate of increase in nominal output can be decomposed into the rate of increase
in real output and prices. Further, if real wages increase at the same rate as real
output, the following holds:
ˆ  Y N = ˆ  Y + ˆ  P = ˆ  A + ˆ  P = ˆ  w + ˆ  P  (5)
where P represents prices and w represents real wages.
Given that ˆ  Y 
N is known, if the statistician underestimates  ˆ  Y , then the rate of price
increase is overstated. In the extreme case, if technological progress is occurring but
is assumed to be zero, the increase in nominal output is treated as inflation. It also
means that measured real wages growth is zero, when in fact real wages are
increasing.
We now move to partial equilibrium, assuming that labour does not move, or at
least moves slowly, between sectors. In this case, an industry with relatively fast
productivity growth should experience an increase in its relative nominal wage
(because the relative marginal product of labour has increased) and a reduction in
the relative price of its output (because relative marginal cost has declined).
Therefore:
ˆ  W  i > ˆ  W  and  ˆ  P  i < ˆ  P  (6)
where W denotes the nominal wage and subscript i represents industry i.
This relationship implies that in the industry with relatively fast productivity growth,
not only does the nominal wage increase relatively quickly, but so too does the
relative product wage. Now consider what happens when the statistician incorrectly
assumes that there is zero productivity growth in this industry. In this case, the
increase in nominal output is interpreted as an increase in price, and thus the
following relationships may apply:
ˆ  W  i > ˆ  W  and  ˆ  P  i < ˆ  P  (7)
While the nominal wage in the high-productivity-growth industry is still likely to
increase faster than in the economy as a whole, the same is now also true for prices,
so that the real product wage in the industry increases by a smaller amount than
when there are no measurement problems. In the extreme case, if all sectors
suffered the same measurement problems, those sectors with the fastest productivity
growth would experience increases, rather than decreases, in their relative prices.
Thus changes in relative prices and real product wages may give misleading signals38
as to relative rates of productivity growth. On the other hand, changes in nominal
wages are likely to be subject to fewer measurement problems and, as a result, the
behaviour of nominal wages might help provide insight into productivity outcomes
at the industry level.
Suppose a sector shows negative productivity growth and a relatively fast increase
in its implicit price deflator, but also a relatively large increase in its relative wage
and its share of the economy’s resources. This suggests that productivity growth in
the sector is being mismeasured – a low-productivity-growth sector should not be
able to attract an increasing share of resources and at the same time, pay those
resources more than they are being paid elsewhere.
This analysis assumes that wages are determined by the marginal product of labour
and that marginal products are not quickly equalised across sectors. Both
assumptions are subject to question. If wages are set exogenously (at least for a
period of time) and the economy is at less than full employment, a decline in real
product wages will generate increased employment. Unless there is an improvement
in technology, this increased employment will cause a decline in labour-productivity
growth (that is, there will be a movement along the demand curve as opposed to a
technology-induced  shift of the curve). The other caveat is that in general
equilibrium, nominal wages (adjusted for skill) in all sectors increase at the same
rate, irrespective of industry productivity performance. Despite these qualifications,
data on nominal wages may be useful in interpreting the industry productivity
outcomes.
4.2 Productivity and Relative Nominal Wages
We now turn to the data on sectoral relative earnings and productivity growth. We
have data on average weekly earnings of managerial and non-managerial workers in
each of the 11 sectors. Figure 14 shows the relationship between labour-
productivity growth and the change in relative earnings. The vertical axis shows the
change in the log of labour productivity between March 1978 and June 1994; the
faster an industry’s productivity growth, the higher is the industry on the vertical
scale. The horizontal axis shows, for the same period, the change in the ratio of
average weekly earnings in the sector to economy-wide average weekly earnings;
industries to the right of the vertical line at zero have experienced larger than
average percentage increases in earnings. The top panel uses earnings of managerial
workers and the bottom panel uses earnings of non-managerial wages.23
                                               
23 For managerial workers, the 1978 observations are for private-sector, full-time male workers.
The 1993, observations are for total (private and government), full-time male workers. For39
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If relatively fast labour-productivity growth in one sector leads to an increase in the
relative nominal earnings paid in that sector, the observations in these graphs should
lie around an upward sloping line. While the relationship between relative
productivity growth and relative earnings is quite weak, it does appear that in the
wholesale and retail trade and recreation, personal and other services sectors,
relative earnings for both managerial and non-managerial workers have declined.24
In contrast, workers in the high-productivity-growth mining sector experienced
increases in their relative earnings. The data also suggest that in the utilities
industry, the high productivity growth has been reflected in the wages of managerial
workers, but not in the wages of the non-managerial workers. One possible
explanation of this difference is that the technological change that has taken place in
                                                                                                                                                      
non-managerial workers the data for both time periods are for total (private and government)
full-time workers. The data are from ABS Cat. Nos 6304.0 and 6305.0.
24 The growth of part-time employment in these industries also has a role to play in explaining
relative changes in average weekly earnings. More generally, changes in the relative education
and skill levels of workers in different industries may influence the relationship between
productivity growth and wages as well.40
this industry is biased against relatively unskilled labour. It is also possible that the
rather weak relationship between relative wages and relative labour productivity
growth may reflect the fact that the 16-year time period is long enough for the
general equilibrium results to establish themselves.
The finance, property and business services industry appears to be an outlier. Non-
managerial workers in this industry have gained larger increases in earnings than
workers in any other industry, with the exception of the mining industry. Further,
the increases paid to managerial workers were the highest in any sector. At the
same time that the finance sector was paying relatively large wage increases it was
increasing its share of total hours worked; the share rose from 8.2 per cent in March
1978 to 12.7 per cent in June 1994.
Despite these changes, the data show a fall in the level of labour productivity in the
finance sector over this 16 year period. Even if we abstract from the problems
caused by the differences in the Survey of Employment and Earnings and the
Labour Force Survey, measured labour-productivity growth in the industry was
essentially zero. As the above discussion indicated, it is difficult to reconcile zero
productivity growth with rising relative wages and a rising employment share. This
suggests that the assumption of zero labour-productivity growth in the finance
industry is inappropriate. In fact, the increasing relative wages in this sector is
suggestive of substantial productivity improvement.
4.3 Productivity and Real Product Wages
Employment decisions are made on the basis of real product wages not real
consumption wages. Over long periods of time the price  deflators in different
industries can move quite differently. Over the period from 1978/79 to 1992/93, the
average annual increase in the implicit price deflator for the mining industry was 4.2
per cent, while the deflators for the recreation, personal and other services and
finance, property and business services industries increased at annual rates of over
8.5 per cent. Such differences, cumulated over a long period of time can make large
differences to the real product wages paid in the various sectors of the economy.
Provided there are no measurement problems, sectors that experience relatively
rapid productivity growth should experience increases in their real product wages,
as the productivity improvements tend to put upward pressure on the sector’s
nominal wage and downward pressure on the price of the sector’s output.
Conversely, sectors with relatively low productivity growth should have declining
product wages. As discussed above, this can also occur when there is excess supply41
in the labour market; in this case declining product wages ‘cause’ a decline in
productivity by allowing less productive labour to be employed.25
Figure 15 is similar to Figure 14 but now the horizontal axis shows the percentage
change in real product wages over the period 1978 to 1993. Here, the observations
tend to lie much more clearly around an upward sloping line. This implies that the
faster is a sector’s labour-productivity growth, relative to the economy as whole, the
larger is the increase in the sector’s real product wage. That is, differences in
productivity growth tend to show up in relative prices,
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25 This discussion ignores the impact of demand-side factors on product wages. This reflects the
notion that an increase in demand should not permanently affect wages and prices,
independently of its impact on the supply side; if marginal cost is constant, higher demand
might drive up prices temporarily, but competition should eventually bid away any excess
returns. There is, however, a role for the demand side to have a permanent effect of prices if
the industry is subject to diminishing returns; if higher demand draws in more resources and
reduces the marginal product then relative prices may increase.42
rather than relative wages. This positive (negative) correlation between productivity
growth and real product wages (relative prices) is an enduring one. In examining
wage and price outcomes in Australian manufacturing in the 1950s,  Whitehead
(1963, p. 189) found that approximately 70 per cent of changes in relative prices
were associated with differential productivity movements. A similar conclusion was
reached by Salter (1960) is his study of UK manufacturing.
This positive association between productivity growth and real product wages it
well illustrated by the recreation, personal and other services sector; it experienced
the poorest productivity performance and it has also experienced the largest decline
in its product wage. This decline reflects both relatively low nominal wage
increases and a relatively rapid increase in the sector’s price deflator. Apart from
the difficulty of capturing changes in the quality of service provided, the
measurement of real output in this sector is not plagued with serious problems. The
low nominal wage increases suggest that the sector’s overall productivity
performance has indeed been relatively poor and, as a result, the relative price of
the sector’s output has increased. A similar picture emerges for the construction and
the wholesale and retail trade sectors.
Together, wholesale and retail trade and recreation, personal and other services
accounted for 31 per cent of the additional hours worked between March 1983 and
December 1989. Workers in these industries tend, on average, to be less highly
skilled than workers in the economy as a whole, and have weaker job tenure.
Through holding down their real wages and allowing greater flexibility in work
arrangements, firms found it profitable to take on workers, even though there was
relatively little productivity growth in these sectors. Almost by definition, these new
workers had lower levels of labour productivity than the existing workers, as firms
were only willing to employ them at lower real product wages. In simple terms, a
reduction in relative product wages was required to generate the jobs in sectors in
which productivity growth was less than average; this reduction was brought about
through wage restraint, but an increase in the relative price of the sectors’ output
also played an important role.
Measured real product wages have also fallen in finance, property and business
services, but unlike the recreation sector, relative nominal wages have risen. The
fall in product wages in this sector, is driven solely by the increase in the relative
price of the sector’s output. As discussed above, if a sector experiences productivity
growth, but no growth is recorded, the measured price of the sector’s output will
increase. This appears to be what has happened in the finance industry, particularly
in the period following the deregulation of the financial system. To a large extent,
the increasing relative nominal wages in the sector reflect productivity growth, but
this increase in wages is offset by an overstated increase in the price of the sector’s
output. The problems induced by this distortion are likely to increase through time,43
as the finance, property and business service sector is accounting for an increasing
share of hours worked.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The past decade and half has seen considerable  liberalisation of the Australian
economy and extensive microeconomic reform. While these reforms promised a
faster rate of labour-productivity growth, it is only over the past few years that we
have any signs in the published data that this is being delivered. In fact, there was
virtually no increase in the measured level of labour-productivity over the second
half of the 1980s. In part, this reflects a number of measurement problems together
with the fact that an increasing share of the work-force was finding jobs. While
some of the recent pick-up in productivity growth is related to the business cycle, a
number of fundamental factors, in combination with a lessening of measurement
problems, gives cause for optimism that Australia’s trend rate of productivity
growth is now higher than that of the 1980s.
The reasons for changes in productivity growth have long presented a puzzle for
economists. This paper attempts to find, and to put together, just a few pieces of the
puzzle. These pieces are found in the industry-based data. These data provide
insights into the industries driving the aggregate results and, combined with data on
wages, raise some important measurement issues. They also provide insight into the
links between industry labour-productivity growth and industry relative wages.
While measurement problems are an unfortunate fact of life in decomposing
nominal output into its price and quantity components, the problems appear to have
been particularly pronounced over the second half of the 1980s. In the retail
industry, the extension of shopping hours increased employment and the provision
of ‘convenience’, but this was not captured in the output statistics. In the finance,
property and business services sector, the rapid employment growth over the second
half of the 1980s appears to have been underestimated by the series that is used to
extrapolate output growth. In the construction industry, output may have been
underestimated due to the unusually rapid increase in the dwelling construction
deflator.
While compositional effects also play some role in explaining the low productivity
growth of the 1980s, the role is relatively minor. However, one area where they
may have been important is in recreation, personal and other services industry.
Within this sector, there was strong growth in employment in restaurants which,
according to the published statistics, tend to have relatively low levels of labour
productivity. Thus, as this sector expands, measured labour-productivity growth is
retarded, although to date, this effect has been relatively small.44
These compositional effects raise an important issue. As income levels continue to
increase, activities that were once undertaken in the home (for example, preparing
food) are increasingly being undertaken in the market sector. While such a move
tends to increase people’s living standards, it slows the increase in conventional
measures of average living standards. As the service sector continues to grow, given
current measurement practices, the relationship between improvements in actual
living standards and the amount of output produced per hour worked may weaken
further. Only by moving to some other broader concept of output – which includes
convenience – might trends in labour productivity more closely match trends in
living standards.
Not all industries experienced a slowdown in labour productivity growth over the
second half of the 1980s. The utilities, mining, communications and transport and
storage industries all recorded faster labour-productivity growth between March
1983 and June 1991 than in the previous five years. To some extent this
improvement in performance reflected the reforms taking place in these industries.
The  macroeconomic benefits of these reforms, however, were masked by
developments in other industries.
Notwithstanding the particulars of individual industries, the decline in real wages
between 1983 and 1989 played an important role in underpinning the productivity
growth slowdown in the 1980s. Falling real wages allowed firms to take on
additional workers – whether it be in retail stores, community services, or in the
hospitality sector – despite the fact that the extra output produced by a new worker
was less than that produced, on average, by existing workers. This employment-
induced decline in labour productivity should not be seen as a bad outcome, as
unemployed workers went from producing no measured output, to contributing
positively to measured national income. In doing so, they contributed to rising living
standards, if not rising labour productivity.
In the longer term, the causation between wages and productivity clearly runs the
other way, with increases in economy-wide labour productivity generating higher
aggregate real wages. At the industry level, the picture is a little more complicated.
In the short term, higher productivity growth in one industry may generate higher
wages in that industry. Eventually, however, labour is mobile between industries, so
that differences in wages across industries (adjusted for skill) cannot increase
without bound. In the long run, even those sectors with no productivity growth must
pay higher wages and thus differences in productivity growth tend to show up in
relative prices, and not relative wages.
Looking forward, a critical question is whether the increase in labour productivity
seen over the past three years represents a cyclical rebound or the start of a period
of continuing strong productivity growth. If it is just cyclical, or a one-time level45
adjustment, and the pattern of the 1980s is to be repeated, then the level of labour
productivity is unlikely to increase much before the end of the decade. This would
have serious implications for the sort of wage increases that are consistent with
maintaining a low-inflation environment.
While some slowing of the recent pick-up in labour productivity growth is
inevitable, there are some tentative signs that productivity growth over the 1990s is
going to exceed that in the 1980s. Labour productivity is still increasing solidly
three and a half years after the trough of the recession. At the equivalent point in the
mid-1980s recovery, labour productivity growth had ceased. In terms of the
fundamentals, the increasing competition brought about by the Hilmer Reforms and
the internationalisation of the economy should have positive influences on
labour-productivity growth. The dividend from past and continuing investments in
computerisation and information technologies should also help underpin
productivity growth. While it is difficult to predict future measurement problems, it
is quite possible that they will be less severe over the second half of the 1990s, than
they were over the second half of the 1980s. This is clearest in the retail industry,
where much of the adjustment to deregulation of hours has been completed. In
coming years, continuing improvements in technology and the move to larger stores
should allow this industry to contribute positively to measured aggregate labour-
productivity growth.
While picking changes in the trend rate of labour-productivity growth is a difficult
task and is subject to considerable uncertainty, there is little evidence to suggest that
the experience of the 1980s is the right benchmark. While the evidence is still
unclear, the signs appear to be emerging of a faster rate of trend labour-productivity
growth. Such an outcome is essential if both employment and real wages are to
increase in a sustainable way.46
Appendix: The Structure of the Retail Industry













$m 1991/92 % 1991/92 % change 1991/92 % change
Supermarket and grocery 9,476 179,619 26,093 560 23.3 4,918 5.4 145,269 8.9
Meat, fish and poultry 7,337 28,324 2,772 97 -2.0 3,899 8.6 97,868 -7.8
Fruit and vegetables 3,650 18,032 1,871 170 31.6 3,008 -3.9 103,760 3.8
Liquor 1,882 8,786 2,130 213 -10.2 5,312 2.4 242,431 -13.1
Bread and cakes 4,755 29,715 1,165 108 21.1 2,267 -11.3 39,206 -16.1
Takeaway food 20,334 131,126 5,299 92 7.4 2,832 4.3 40,412 -17.2
Specialised food n.e.c. 5,773 22,045 1,898 82 23.3 3,996 5.4 86,097 8.9
Total specialised food 43,731 238,028 15,134 105 11.2 3,294 -5.0 63,581 -18.7
Total food retailing 53,207 417,647 41,227 186 10.9 4,164 1.0 98,713 -6.2
Department stores 430 86,576 9,798 9,084 3.1 2,508 -10.5 113,172 3.5
Clothing 15,564 64,537 6,314 150 13.6 2,696 -5.7 97,835 -1.6
Footwear 3,188 13,897 1,303 132 -6.2 3,088 3.7 93,761 -2.0
Fabrics and other soft goods 3,309 13,219 1,080 177 24.0 1,846 -12.3 81,701 -2.5
Total clothing and soft goods 22,061 91,653 8,697 152 12.0 2,597 -5.0 94,891 -1.3
Furniture 3,032 14,401 2,507 670 17.3 1,234 -18.8 174,085 -10.5
Floor covering 1,361 5,413 978 348 -9.8 2,063 -10.1 180,676 -14.6
Domestic hardware and
housewares 5,036 28,781 3,506 393 40.8 1,771 -4.4 121,816 12.8
Domestic appliances 4,045 20,555 4,446 287 15.1 3,829 -3.3 216,298 8.8
Recorded music retailing 838 3,353 444 105 11.3 5,045 10.9 132,419 9.047
Total furniture, houseware,
appliances 14,312 72,503 11,881 401 20.2 2,072 -8.8 163,869 0.2
Sport and camping equipment 3,356 11,568 1,186 180 16.8 1,960 -6.9 102,524 -0.2
Toys and games 989 3,884 391 190 16.8 2,080 -6.9 100,669 -0.2
Newspapers, books and
stationery
6,928 35,860 4,014 138 -18.6 4,199 29.7 111,935 -6.1
Photographic equipment 428 2,225 343 110 38.8 7,298 32.5 154,157 27.0
Marine equipment retailing 644 2,760 437 186 22.0 3,642 -36.0 158,333 -22.7
Total recreational goods 12,345 56,297 6,371 155 4.6 3,323 1.6 113,168 -6.0
Pharmaceutical, cosmetics and
  toiletries 5,646 38,932 4,084 136 9.2 5,325 15.0 104,901 7.8
Antiques and used goods 4,268 10,111 637 186 24.7 803 -16.4 63,001 -4.5
Garden supplies 2,420 9,430 626 662 17.7 391 -7.3 66,384 2.4
Flowers 2,567 7,079 341 65 17.2 2,042 -7.3 48,171 2.2
Watches and jewellery 3,512 16,073 1,451 80 -2.8 5,182 49.4 90,276 31.3
Retailing n.e.c. 9,513 29,401 2,066 116 -3.1 1,876 15.3 70,270 -7.6
Total other personal and




3,258 9,633 506 95 n.a 1,627 n.a 52,528 n.a
Total personal and household
goods 80,332 427,688 46,458 248 8.4 2,331 -7.1 108,626 -1.0
Note: Percentage changes are from 1985/86 to 1991/92.
Source: ABS Cat. No. 8623.1.48
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